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Abstract
A general class of adaptive strategies in Hart and Mas−Colell (2001) may be extended to
conditional strategies in the same way as smooth fictitious play in Fudenberg and Levine
(1999). We show that a generalized version of universal conditional consistency (UCC)
obtains for conditional adaptive strategies under some assumption.
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We show that a general class of adaptive strategies in Hart and Mas-Colell (2001)
may be extended to conditional strategies in the same way as smooth ﬁctitious play
in Fudenberg and Levine (1999), and a “classwise generalization” of universal condi-
tional consistency (abbreviated to UCC) obtains for conditional adaptive strategies
under some assumption, as it does for conditional smooth ﬁctitious play (Fudenberg
and Levine (1999) and Noguchi (2000) and (2002)).
Hart and Mas-Colell (2001) shows a general class of adaptive strategies which
has the property of universal consistency by generalizing Blackwell’s approacha-
bility theorem; we say universal consistency because the consistency criterion is
passed against all opposing strategies. On the other hand, Fudenberg and Levine
(1999) extend smooth ﬁctitious play to conditional one by introducing learning rules
called “classiﬁcation rules,” taking into consideration the case in which a player has
a sophisticated ability of learning regularities of opponent strategies. Then, they
generalize universal consistency in Fudenberg and Levine (1995) to “universal con-
ditional consistency” for conditional smooth ﬁctitious play. Furthermore, Noguchi
(2000) and (2002) generalizes their UCC theorem to a classwise version for smooth
ﬁctitious play. (Generalized) UCC is quite useful to show that a player’s strategy
is a sophisticated learning procedure. Noguchi (2000) makes use of (generalized)
UCC to show that conditional smooth ﬁctitious play passes strong time-average op-
timality criteria for many opposing strategies. Moreover, Noguchi (2002) shows that
generalized UCC implies the same wide range no-regret property as Lehrer (2003)
obtains.
Smooth ﬁctitious play is not included in the Hart and Mas-Colell’s general class
of adaptive strategies, but it may be arbitrarily approximated by adaptive strategies,
as Hart and Mas-Colell point out. This fact leads us to infer that adaptive strategies
in the Hart and Mas-Colell’s sense may also be extended to conditional ones, and
that those have the generalized property of universal conditional consistency. The
purpose of this paper is to show it is correct at least under some assumption.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we shall give the basic model
and deﬁne conditional adaptive strategies. In Section 3 we shall show a classwise
generalization of universal conditional consistency for conditional adaptive strategies
under some assumption. Section 4 concludes.
12 The Model
2.1 The basic model and notations
We focus on one player who plays an inﬁnitely repeated game against one opponent.
The player’s payoﬀ at a stage game is denoted by u(a,y), where a is a player’s
action in a ﬁnite set A and y is an opponent’s action in a ﬁnite set Y .L e t ∆(S)
denote the set of all mixed actions over S.L e tu(λ,π) denote the player’s expected
payoﬀ obtained by playing mixed actions λ ∈ ∆(A)a n dπ ∈ ∆(Y ). A ﬁnite history
of actions (up to time T)i sd e n o t e db yhT := (a1,y 1 ···,a T,y T)a n da ni n ﬁnite
history of actions is denoted by h∞ := (a1,y 1,a 2,y 2,···). The set of all ﬁnite
histories, including the null history h0 := ∅, is denoted by H,a n dH∞ is the set of
all inﬁnite histories. We denote a behavior strategy of a player by σ : H → ∆(A),
and a behavior strategy of an opponent by ρ : H → ∆(Y ). We write µ(σ,ρ) for the
stochastic process on H∞ induced by playing σ and ρ.
2.2 Conditional adaptive strategies and classiﬁcation rules
We shall extend adaptive strategies in Hart and Mas-Colell (2001) to conditional
strategies. In this paper we focus on a stationary regret-based action Φ : RA →
∆(A):1 (i) there exists a continuously diﬀerentiable function P : RA → R such
that Φ(x) is positively proportional to the derivative ∂P(x)f o ra l lx/ ∈ RA
− and (ii)
Φ(x) · x>0f o ra l lx/ ∈ RA
−.2 P is called a potential of Φ.
First of all, we shall deﬁne an important concept: classiﬁcation rules.C l a s s i ﬁ-
cation rules, introduced as learning rules by Fudenberg and Levine (1999), classify
observed samples into categories. Formally, a classiﬁcation rule R is deﬁned as a
partition of H ×A,3 a n da ne l e m e n ti nR is called a category, denoted by γ;t h u s ,a
category γ may be considered as a subset of H×A.I far e a l i z e dh i s t o r y( ht−1,a t) ∈ γ,
we say that time t is a γ−eﬀective period or γ is eﬀective at time t; given an inﬁnite
history, each period has exactly one eﬀective category because a classiﬁcation rule
is a partition of H × A. Given a history hT,l e tn
γ
T denote the number of times
that γ has been eﬀective up to time T,a n dD
γ
T denote the empirical distribution of
opponent actions observed in γ−eﬀective periods up to time T.
1Hart and Mas-Colell (2001) call it a stationary regret-based strategy.
2A also denotes the cardinality of itself. RA is an A−dimensional Euclidean space. RA
− := {x ∈
RA | x[a] ≤ 0 for all a ∈ A}.
3Fudenberg and Levine (1999) deﬁne a classiﬁcation rule as a function from H×A to a countable
set of categories. But their deﬁnition is equivalent to ours.
2If a player knew in advance that the current period, say time T,w a sγ−eﬀective,
then he would pick up observed regret vectors gt := (u(b,yt) − u(at,y t))b∈A in past
γ−eﬀe c t i v ep e r i o d s ,a n do b t a i nt h econditional average ¯ g
γ
T−1 of regret vectors on γ








T−1. Thus, he would take its stationary
regret-based action Φ(¯ g
γ
T−1)a tt i m eT. However, an eﬀective category may be
endogenous in the sense that which category is eﬀective in the current period may
depend on which player’s action is realized in the current period. Then, we deﬁne
conditional adaptive strategy σ on R by extending the ﬁxed point argument in
Fudenberg and Levine (1999). We ﬁrst assume a weight function w : H → RA
+;w e
will precisely deﬁne it in the Appendix.4 Then, let hT−1 is a realized past history
up to the last period. Let γa be the category that is eﬀective at time T if a is





T−1). Let Z be the matrix in which each column consists of a weighted action
w(hT−1)[a] · Φ(¯ g
γa
T−1): Z := [w(hT−1)[a] · Φ(¯ g
γa
T−1)]a∈A. Note that the magnitudes of
w(hT−1)[a]’s may be diﬀerent. Thus, let J be the matrix whose diagonal elements
are w(hT−1)[a]’s, and whose oﬀ-diagonal elements are all zero. Then, we always ﬁnd
out a mixed action λ
∗ ∈ ∆(A) such that Zλ
∗ = Jλ
∗.5 Finally, the player takes
σ(hT−1): =λ
∗ at time T. We call the procedure conditional (weighted) adaptive
strategy on R.
2.3 Class
A subset of H ×A will also be called a class, denoted by β. When a realized history
(ht−1,a t) ∈ β, we say that time t is a β−active period,o rt h a tβ is active at time
t. A class indicates periods when payoﬀs are evaluated. Given a history hT,l e tn
β
T
denote the number of times that β h a sb e e na c t i v eu pt ot i m eT,a n dD
β
T denote the
empirical distribution of opposing actions observed in β−active periods up to time
T.
4RA
+ := {x ∈ RA | x[a] ≥ 0 for all a ∈ A}.
5Let ϕ(λ): = J
−1Zλ
b∈A(J−1Zλ)[b]. It is a continuous function from ∆(A)t o∆(A). By the ﬁxed point
theorem, there exists a ﬁxed point λ
∗ of ϕ. Then, Zλ
∗ = αJλ













∗)[b]. Thus, α = 1. Therefore,
Zλ
∗ = Jλ
∗. Hart and Mas-Colell (2000) call this type of procedure eigenvector procedures.
33 Universal classwise conditional consistency
3.1 Deﬁnition and main result
We shall generalize universal conditional consistency in Fudenberg and Levine (1999)
to a classwise version for adaptive strategies. Let us ﬁrst deﬁne classwise condi-
tional consistency for a countable set Ω of classes; Ω is always countable in the
following. The criterion requires that conditional consistency hold in active peri-
o d so fa n yc l a s si nΩ (if that class is active inﬁnitely many times). To deﬁne it
precisely, when a realized history (ht−1,a t) ∈ β
T
γ,i . e . ,b o t hβ is active and γ
is eﬀective at time t, we say that time t is βγ−eﬀective. Given a history hT,l e t
n
βγ
T denote the number of βγ−eﬀective periods up to time T,a n dD
βγ
T denote the
empirical distribution of opponent actions observed in βγ−eﬀective periods up to
time T.L e t ¯ U
β









T.T h e m a x i m u m p a y o ﬀ against π is given by
V (π): =m a x a u(a,π).
Deﬁnition 1 We say that conditional (weighted) adaptive strategy σ on R passes
classwise conditional consistency for Ω against ρ, if for all β ∈ Ω,i fn
β
T →∞as













T ) − ¯ U
β
T ≤ 0, µ(σ,ρ) − a.s.
When Ω = {H × A}, classwise conditional consistency is reduced to conditional
consistency. To obtain universal classwise conditional consistency, we impose two
assumptions on R and Ω.T h eﬁrst assumption requires that a classiﬁcation rule be
eventually ﬁner than any class.
Assumption (A1) For all h∞ ∈ H∞ and all β ∈ Ω,t h e r ee x i s t sT0 such that for
all γ ∈ R,e i t h e r
for all T ≥ T0,i f (hT−1,a T) ∈ γ,t h e n(hT−1,a T) ∈ β,
or for all T ≥ T0,i f (hT−1,a T) ∈ γ,t h e n(hT−1,a T) / ∈ β.
The second one requires that the number of eﬀective categories grow quite slowly
in active periods of any class. Given a history hT,l e tK
β
T denote the number of
categories that have been eﬀective in β−active periods (up to time T).
4Assumption (A2) For all h∞ ∈ H∞ and all β ∈ Ω,i fn
β










When Ω = {H×A}, Assumption (A1) is automatically satisﬁed and Assumption
(A2) is reduced to Assumption 1 in Fudenberg and Levine (1999). Assumptions (A1)
and (A2) may be natural requirements about a classiﬁcation rule and a countable set
of classes, but the following last assumption about a stationary regret-based action
Φ is rather restrictive.
Assumption (B1) A potential P of Φ satisﬁes that ∂P(x)·x ≥ P(x)f o ra l lx/ ∈ RA
−.
lp−potentials (1 <p<∞) and separable potentials with a monotone property
are typical examples that satisfy Assumption (B1).6 We shall show that under the
assumptions above, conditional (weighted) adaptive strategy on R has universal
classwise conditional consistency for Ω.
Theorem Suppose that a classiﬁcation rule R and a countable set Ω of classes
satisfy Assumptions (A1) and (A2) and a stationary regret-based action Φ satis-
ﬁes Assumption (B1). Then, conditional weighted adaptive strategy σ on R has
universal classwise conditional consistency for Ω: σ passes classwise conditional
consistency for Ω against all opposing strategies.
3.2 Proof of Theorem
According to Lemma 2.3 in Hart and Mas-Colell (2001), any potential P of a sta-
tionary regret-based action Φ has the following property: there exists a constant
c0 such that P(x) >c 0 for all x/ ∈ RA
− and P(x)=c0 for all x ∈ bd(RA
−).7 Thus,
without loss of generality, we may assume that any potential P of Φ satisﬁes (P1)
∂P(x) is positively proportional to Φ(x) for all x/ ∈ RA
−,( P 2 )P(x) ≥ 0f o ra l lx,
and (P3) P(x) = 0 if and only if x ∈ RA





p where x+[a]: =m a x {0,x[a]}.L e t {ψa}a∈A be continuous functions
from R to R such that ψa(z) = 0 for all z ≤ 0a n dψa(z) > 0 for all z>0. Then, a separable
potential is deﬁned as P(x): =
P
a∈A Ψa(x[a]), where Ψa(x[a]) :=
R x[a]
−∞ ψa(z)dz for all a ∈ A.
For example, when {ψa}a are non-decreasing, ∂P(x) · x ≥ P(x) for all x/ ∈ RA
−. See Hart and
Mas-Colell (2001) for more examples.
7bd(RA
−) is the boundary of RA
−: bd(RA
−)={x ∈ RA | x[a] ≤ 0 for all a ∈ A,a n dx[a]=0f o r
some a ∈ A}.
8Let ˜ P(x): =( P(x) −c0)2 if x/ ∈ RA
− and ˜ P(x): =0i fx ∈ RA
−. Then, ˜ P is a potential of Φ and
satisﬁes (P1), (P2) and (P3).
5to show two lemmas. We ﬁrst extend an important result in Hart and Mas-Colell
(2001) to a classwise conditional version: conditional average of P in active periods
of any class converges to zero.
Lemma 1 Suppose that a classiﬁcation rule R and a countable set Ω of classes
satisfy Assumptions (A1) and (A2), and a stationary regret-based action Φ satisﬁes
Assumption (B1). Then, conditional weighted adaptive strategy σ on R has the
following property: for all ρ and all β ∈ Ω,i fn
β













T )=0 , µ(σ,ρ) − a.s.
where ¯ g
βγ








Proof. See the Appendix.
The key is that the above lemma induces classwise conditional consistency.

































u(at,y t) ≤ 0.
Proof. We may assume that the domain of P is bounded because the range of
regret vectors are bounded; thus P is uniformly continuous. Then, (P2) and (P3)
imply that for all ε > 0 there exists δε > 0s u c ht h a tP(x) < δε ⇒ maxa x[a] < ε.
Given a history hT,l e tR
β
T(P;δ): ={γ ∈ R|P(¯ g
βγ
T ) < δ}. Then, it follows from the











≥ 1 − η
for all T ≥ Tδη.
Take any ε > 0. Let δ
∗ := δ ε
2 and η∗ := εÁ4¯ u,w h e r e¯ u := maxa,y | u(a,y) |.











≥ 1 − η∗. Note that for all T ≥ Tδ∗η∗,
all γ ∈ R
β
T(P;δ




















































































P r o o fo fT h e o r e m .It is immediate from Lemmas 1 and 2. ¥
4C o n c l u d i n g R e m a r k
We conclude with giving a remark. We have shown universal classwise conditional
consistency by imposing some assumption (i.e., Assumption (B1)) on a stationary
regret-based action. However, we may conjecture that universal classwise condi-
tional consistency obtains without Assumption (B1). Indeed, Noguchi (2003) shows
generalized UCC obtains (without Assumption (B1)) in an uncalibrated case that a
classiﬁcation rule and classes do not depend at all on player’s current actions.
Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1. We may assume that the domain of P is bounded because

































,i f( hT−1,a T) ∈ β,


























T−1), and γ is the eﬀective category at time T, i.e., (hT−1,a T) ∈ γ.N o t et h a t
oβγ
m uniformly converges to 0 as m →∞ .






t=1 Xt[β]a n d[¯ XT]+(h∞)[β]: =m a x {0, ¯ XT(h∞)[β]}.T a k ea n y
probability distribution p =( pβ)β on Ω such that pβ > 0f o ra l lβ ∈ Ω. Then, we















T )[b]), if ∃β ∈ Ω(β 3 (hT,a)),
w(hT)[a]: =0 ,o t h e r w i s e
where γa is the category that is eﬀective at time T +1ifa is realized at time T +1:
(hT,a) ∈ γa.L e th,i denote an inner product on L2.9 The product measure of µ(σ,ρ)
and p is denoted by µ × p.
Step 1:W h e n( hT−1,a T) ∈ β, it follows from (P3) and Assumption (B1) that
XT[β](h∞)=∂P(¯ g
βγ








































T−1.N o t e t h a t δ
β
T =1i fβ is active at time T,a n dδ
β
T =0
otherwise. Let Eµ[·|hT] be conditional expectation on hT (with respect to µ(σ,ρ)).
Then, it follows from the inequality above, (P1), and the deﬁnition of conditional























σ(hT)[a] · ρ(hT)[y] · (
X
β3(hT,a)







T ) · gT+1)
= u(Zσ(hT),ρ(hT)) − u(Jσ(hT),ρ(hT))
=0 .
Step 2:D e ﬁne [ ¯ XT]− := ¯ XT−[ ¯ XT]+ and projL2
−( ¯ XT)(h∞): =a r gm i n Y ∈L2
− k ¯ XT(h∞)−
Y k.10 Then, projL2
−( ¯ XT)=[¯ XT]− and h[ ¯ XT]+(h∞),[ ¯ XT]−(h∞)i = 0. Thus, letting
9hX,Yi :=
P
β pβ ·X[β] · Y [β]a n dL2 := {Y ∈ RΩ |
P
β pβ · (Y [β])2 < ∞}.
10L2
− := {Y ∈ L2 | Y [β] ≤ 0 for all β ∈ Ω}.




Eµ×p[( ¯ Xt − projL2


































Therefore, we can apply a conditional version of the strong law of large numbers
(see Theorem 4 (and Corollary 1) in Lehrer (2002)), so that for all β ∈ Ω,i fn
β
T →∞ ,
[ ¯ XT]+(β) → 0, µ(σ,ρ) − a.s.
Step 3: Given a history hT,l e tR
β




≤ ²}. Then, Assumption
(A2) is equivalent to the following condition: (∗) for all h∞ ∈ H∞,i fn
β
T →∞ ,t h e n











≥ 1 − η for all T ≥ T²η.
Thus, for all h∞ ∈ H∞,i fn
β











































T is the set of all categories that have been eﬀective in β−active periods up
to time T.
Step 4: The range of regret vectors is bounded. It, together with Assumption (A1),
implies that there exists a constant C1 > 0s u c ht h a tf o ra n ye ﬀective category γ in
β−active periods from time T0 on, k¯ g
βγ






T · C1 for all T ≥ T0,w h e r eT0 is
a calendar time in Assumption (A1). Further, there exists C2 > 0 such that for all









T−1)k. From these and Condition (∗)i t
follows that for all h∞ ∈ H∞,i fn
β




















































































=0 , µ(σ,ρ) − a.s.











T ) ≥ 0f o ra l lh∞ ∈ H∞.T h u st h e
desired result obtains. ¥
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